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CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-(3)(a): 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of 
Appeals; 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-5: 
The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of 
certiorari for the review of a Court of 
Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme 
Court shall review those cases certified 
to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
iv 
I. Questions Presented For Review, 
Whether the Court of Appeals failed to follow the 
prior decisions of this Court and other panels of the Court 
of Appeals 1) by increasing the amount of damages awarded by 
the district court to respondents without any showing that 
the district court abused its discretion in setting damagesf 
and 2) by awarding respondents and denying petitioners a 
share of their attorneys1 fees when petitioners were the 
prevailing party below and the only parties possessing a 
contractual right to the recovery of fees. 
II. Opinions Issued By The Court Of Appeals. 
The only opinion issued by the Court of Appeals, 
and the opinion which is the subject of this Petition, is 
dated December 20, 1988. A copy of the opinion is included 
in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit "A." 
III. Grounds On Which The Jurisdiction Of This Court Is 
Invoked. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be 
reviewed was entered on December 20f 1988. On January 13# 
> 
1989, this Court granted Petitioners1 Ex Parte Motion For 
Extension Of Time To File Petition For Writ Of Certiorari. 
This Court possesses jurisdiction to consider this Petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(b) and discretionary 
jurisdiction to grant this Petition pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(5). 
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IV. Statement of the Case, 
A. Nature Of The Case, 
This action was brought by petitioner Stacey Prop-
erties ("Stacey") in the Second Judicial District Court of 
Weber County against respondents Ben Wixenf Francine Wixenf 
Bernie Goler and Bonnie Goler, doing business as Golwix 
Properties, seeking to recover amounts owed to Stacey by re-
spondents under an $80,000 promissory notef and to defeat 
respondents claimed "offsets" against their note payments. 
Respondents asserted counterclaims against Stacey and a 
third-party claim against J. Ron Stacey, individually, seek-
ing to offset their note payments with damages allegedly in-
curred as a result of breaches of warranty and contract by 
Stacey. 
B. Course Of Proceedings And Disposition In Lower 
Courts, 
The District Court, The case was tried to the 
District Court, the Honorable David E, Roth presiding, on 
May 28, 29 and 30f 1986. Because the amount of the damages 
and offsets proved by respondents at trial was more than the 
accrued amount in default under the promissory note, Judge 
Roth concluded that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate 
the due date of the principal balance of the note, and was 
not entitled to recover its attorneys' fees pursuant to the 
2 
terms of the promissory note. (See Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 11 13, included in the Appendix hereto 
as Exhibit "B", hereinafter "F. & C. M). Judge Roth also 
concluded that respondents were not entitled to an award of 
their attorneys1 fees. (^ d. at 1121). 
Stacey appealed contending that the District Court 
erred in concluding that Stacey was not entitled to accel-
erate the principal balance of the note or an award of a 
portion of its attorneys' fees. Respondents cross-appealed, 
arguing that the District Court erred in setting the amount 
of damages that were awarded to respondents in regard to two 
of respondents' counterclaims. Respondents further argued 
that they were entitled to a share of their attorneys' fees 
in proportion to their success on their counterclaims. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's 
decision in regard to Stacey's claims on appeal. Converse-
ly, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondents' limited 
success on their counterclaims entitled them to a share of 
their attorneys' fees. Further, it concluded that the 
District Court had incorrectly assessed the amount of 
damages to which respondents were entitled under one of 
their claims, and therefore, directed that the award be in-
creased. Thus, the matter was remanded to the District Court 
for further proceedings in accordance with the decision. 
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C. Statement Of Facts Relevant To This Petition. 
On May 22, 1984, Stacey sold several commercial 
properties located in and around Ogden, Utah, including the 
Ogden Post Office, to the respondents pursuant to a written 
"Letter Agreement.11 (F. & C. at 111). (A copy of the Letter 
Agreement is included in the Appendix hereto as Exhibit 
"C"). As partial payment for the properties, respondents 
executed a promissory note payable to Stacey in the amount 
of $80,000, with monthly installments payable in the amount 
of $731.79, beginning on June 1, 1984. (Id[. at 1(4; R-
496). (A copy of the note is included in the Appendix 
hereto as Exhibit "D"). With the exception of two early 
payments, respondents failed to make the installment 
payments owing to Stacey under the note. (.Id. at 1(1(3 and 6; 
R-496-497) . 
Instead of making their payments, respondents 
asserted numerous "offsets" against their payments for 
damages allegedly incurred by them as a result of Stacey's 
alleged breach of warranties set forth in the Letter 
Agreement. (R-73-76). In response, Stacey filed a 
Complaint in the Second District Court, seeking amounts 
owing under the note, acceleration of the principal balance 
of the note, plus expenses and attorneys' fees associated 
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with enforcing the provisions of the note in the face of 
respondents' offset claims. (See F. & C. at 116; R-497; 
Complaint). Respondents defended by asserting that the note 
could not be accelerated in light of respondents' offset 
rights; further, they asserted counterclaims and third-party 
claims against petitioners for money damages allegedly 
flowing from Stacey's breaches of warranty. (See Answer; R-
37; Counterclaim). 
At trial, the accrued amount of unpaid installment 
payments owing under the note was $16,099.38; respondents 
asserted offsets and claims for damages under their counter-
claims in the total amount of $88,329.21. (F. & C. at 1MI 6, 
9; R-497; 294). Of that amount, respondents sought approx-
imately $22,758.00 for expenses incurred by them in re-
placing a roof-top air conditioning unit at the Ogden Post 
Office. The balance of the alleged damages related to a 
plethora of other expenses allegedly incurred by 
respondents. (See Id.). 
After hearing the evidence, Judge Roth determined 
that the respondents had proven their entitlement to damages 
in the total amount of $20,362.94. (F. & C. at 1(13; R-502-
505). Of that amount, $6,899.39 was awarded by Judge Roth 
in regard to the air conditioner replacement, and the 
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balance was awarded for certain other expenses or damages 
incurred by respondents. (See Id.). 
A digression is necessary at this point to address 
the District Court's award of damages in regard to the air 
conditioner. Judge Roth concluded that/ at the time of the 
closing of the transaction on May 22, 1984, the rooftop air 
conditioner had only approximately 25% of its useful life 
remaining under normal conditions. (.Id. at 1111(a)(3)). 
Based upon the advanced age of the unit, Stacey warranted 
only that the unit would be "in working order" and would be 
"operative at closing". (Letter Agreement at 111, Exhibit 
"C", hereto) (emphasis added). Although respondents knew 
the air conditioning unit was old, they did not inspect it 
prior to closing and did not cause any springtime 
maintenance or "check up" to be performed on the unit prior 
to its start-up by the Post Office for the summer season. 
(R-457; 581-82). 
Post office personnel testified that they turned 
the unit on for the season on May 19 or May 26, 1984, with-
out checking the oil or refrigerant level, (R-112; 134), a 
practice which post office personnel admitted could lead to 
a "catastrophe" concerning the unit. (R-133-34). There-
after, on May 29, 1984, post office personnel observed that 
the unit was not working. (R-112; Exhibit D-7). 
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On June 22, 1984, the Holbrook Company inspected 
the unit and found that the oil safety switch had been 
Mtrippedflf shutting down the unit because it was low on 
refrigerant and was leaking oil. (R-171-73; 179). Holbrook 
employees testified that they fixed the unit on June 26, 
1984. (.Id.) Additionally, their work records, as well as 
the post office's records, expressly stated that, before 
Holbrook left, the unit was "checked for operation", further 
evidencing that the unit was operable and in working 
order. (R-139; 166; 175-76; 181; 218-19; Exhibits D-7; P-
25, P-25A). Holbrook charged respondents $1,030.32 for the 
June 26, 1984 repairs. (R-181; Exhibit P-25A). 
After almost a month of no reported problems with 
the unit, Holbrook again inspected the unit on July 25, 1984 
and found that it was operating, but that it was running on 
"high suction pressure." (R-187-188). Thus, Holbrook de-
cided to take the unit to its shop for further "inspection"; 
from that inspection, Holbrook concluded that the compressor 
was damaged, probably as a result of the unit being run 
while it was low on oil. (R-189; 210). Significantly, 
Holbrook employees acknowledged that the damage to the 
compressor could have occurred within "a short period of 
time" and could have occurred as a result of lack of oil in 
the unit at the 1984 spring start up. (R-219-220). 
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A single Holbrook employee testified that his esti-
mated cost of repairing the unit at the end of the summer of 
1984 was $19,000 to $20,000; based on the high estimated 
cost of repair, he therefore recommended that respondents 
purchase a new unit. (R-211). Respondents did not solicit 
any other estimates for repairing the unit and simply deter-
mined to replace the unit at a cost of approximately 
$22/758.00. (R-224). Significantly, respondents never 
contacted Stacey concerning any problems with the unit 
throughout the spring and summer of 1984 until after they 
had replaced the unit. (R-427). Further, Stacey was never 
given the opportunity to inspect the old unit before it was 
destroyed by Holbrook in 1984. (R-221). 
After hearing testimony from at least five differ-
ent persons concerning the unit, Judge Roth concluded that, 
"according to the circumstantial evidence11, the unit was not 
"in working order and operative on May 22, 1984." (F. & C. 
at 1111(a)(1)). However, Judge Roth also concluded that, in 
light of the evidence and respondents1 knowledge that they 
were purchasing an old unit, respondents would receive a 
windfall if they were awarded the entire cost of replacing 
the unit with a new one. (Id. at 11(a)(3); 1113(a)(2); R-
582). He therefore concluded that respondents would be 
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fairly compensated by an award of twenty-five percent of the 
cost they incurred in replacing the new unit, which 
percentage was based upon the approximate remaining useful 
life of the replaced unit under normal conditions. (Id). 
Judge Roth ordered that the air conditioner 
damages, as well as the other damages proved by the respond-
ents, be credited against the defaulted installment payments 
due under the note. (F. & C. at 1118). Since those damages 
were slightly greater than the amount in default, Judge Roth 
concluded that Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the 
principal balance of the note, but that respondents were to 
resume their note payments after credit was given for their 
damages. (^ d.) Judge Roth further concluded that, since 
Stacey was not entitled to accelerate the note, it was not 
entitled to a share of its attorneys' fees. (IdL at 1(20). 
Similarly, he concluded that respondents were not entitled 
to an award of their attorneys' fees. (Ld. at 1(21). 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court of Appeals Failed to Follow This Court's 
Previous Decisions in Reversing the District Court's 
Damage Award in Connection With the Air Conditioning 
Unit, 
The Court of Appeals concluded that Judge Roth had 
erred in setting the amount of damages in connection with 
the air conditioning unit at twenty-five percent of the re-
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placement cost of the new unit. (Court of Appeals Decision 
at p. 5). The Court reasoned, without any analysis of the 
evidence, that such an award failed to place the respondents 
in as good a position as if Stacey had not breached its 
warranty regarding the air conditioner. (I_d.) Therefore, 
it ordered the District Court to increase the damage award 
to $19,000-$20,000, which, according to one Holbrook employ-
ee, was the estimated cost of repairing the unit in August 
of 1984. (^ d.) As is shown below, however, that conclusion 
wholly disregards the evidence before Judge Roth and is con-
trary to numerous decisions of this Court vesting the 
District Courts with a large degree of discretion in setting 
the amount of damages. 
On several recent occasions, this Court has 
observed the following regarding the appellate review of the 
amount of damage awards: 
In fixing damages, the trial court is 
vested with broad discretion and the award 
will not be set aside unless it is mani-
festly unjust or indicates that the trial 
court neglected pertinent elements, or was 
unduly influenced by prejudice or other 
extraneous elements. 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 
1984); Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315, 318 (Utah 1983); 
Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130 
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(Utah 1982). As the trier of fact is in the best position 
to assess the weight of the evidence and the credibility and 
bias of the witnesses, an appellate court "is constrained to 
look at the whole of the evidence in a light favorable to 
the trial court's findings, including any fair inferences to 
be drawn from the evidence and all circumstances shown." 
Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 
1977). As long as there is some rational basis for the 
computation of damages, the finder of facts1 determination 
should be upheld on review. See, e.g., Clayton v. 
Crossroads Equipment Co., supra; Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 
448 P.2d 709, 712 (Utah 1968); see generally Hall v. 
Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Utah 1977)("[I]f the evidence 
is such that reasonable minds may differ as to the 
conclusion to be drawn . . . this court should not interfere 
with . . . [the trier of fact's] determination thus made."). 
The Court of Appeals, by concluding that the only 
proper award of damages was $19,000 to $20,000, impliedly 
held that the District Court was constrained to accept the 
respondents' theory of damages because it had accepted the 
respondents1 theory of liability. This Court, however, has 
rejected that notion on numerous occasions, including in a 
case involving remarkably similar facts to this one. In 
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Arnold Machinery Company v. Intrusion Prepakt, Inc., 357 
P.2d 496 (Utah I960), the plaintiff sought damages incurred 
as a result of having to repair a burned out compressor 
unit. Although the evidence in the record indicated that 
the plaintiff incurred $3,580.52 in repair expenses, the 
jury awarded only $2,500. On appeal, the plaintiff-appellant 
argued that the jury's award constituted legal error and 
that the only proper award of damages was $3,580.52. This 
Court disagreed. It noted: 
[T]he jury was not obliged to follow ab-
jectly the plaintiff's evidence, but had 
the right to place their own evaluation 
upon the repairs made under their undoubt-
ed prerogative of judging the credibility 
of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. 
357 P.2d at 497; see also Even Odds, Inc. v. Nelson, supra 
at 712 ("[The trial court] is not bound to slavishly follow 
the evidence and figures given by any particular witness."); 
Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah 1976) (trial 
court was not compelled to accept successful party's 
testimony concerning its damages). 
In Arnold Machinery, this Court explained some of 
the factors "which the jury could reasonably have thought to 
justify finding an amount less than that claimed by 
plaintiff." JA. Those factors included the possibility that 
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not all of the claimed expenses were necessary, that the 
amounts charged were excessive, and that the evidence 
concerning the repairs was presented through biased 
witnesses who the fact-finder was entitled to believe or not 
believe, in whole or in part. Id. 
Similarly, in this matter, Judge Roth was entitled 
to believe or disbelieve the testimony of the sole Holbrook 
employee, Bob Banford, who testified that the estimated re-
pair cost of the unit in August of 1984 was $19,000-
$20,000. No other competitive bids were solicited, and 
Stacey was not allowed to even inspect the unit before it 
was removed and destroyed. (R-221-224.) Further, 
Mr. Banford had an obvious financial interest in the 
transaction as he sold a new unit to respondents and his 
compensation was based, in part, upon the profits of 
Holbrook Company. (R-221-22.) 
Beyond issues relating to Mr. Banford1s credibility 
or bias, there were also significant questions concerning 
whether the breach of warranty regarding the unit caused 
damages of the magnitude claimed by respondents. Again, 
Stacey warranted only that the unit was "operable11 and "in 
working order" on the date of closing, May 22, 1984. 
However, the evidence indicated that the unit was working 
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and operable for several days during that period, and after 
a $1,000 repair in June, operated for almost a month. (R-
171-73; 179; R-187-88). Indeed, the unit was operating, 
albeit with "high suction pressure," when it was removed by 
Holbrook on July 25, 1984. (R-187-88). Further, there was 
evidence suggesting that the post office's start-up of the 
unit in the spring of 1984, without checking the oil or 
refrigerant level, was a dangerous procedure that, even 
according to Holbrook employees, could have caused or con-
tributed to the ultimate failure of the compressor and re-
lated problems. (R-219-220). 
Thus, in light of the large amount of rather 
ambiguous testimony concerning the cause of the ultimate 
demise of the unit, and in light of Stacey's limited 
warranty, respondents failed to present persuasive evidence 
to Judge Roth that Stacey's breach resulted in such a large 
amount of damages. Judge Roth properly concluded that 
respondents would receive a windfall and be placed in a 
better position than that to which they had contracted if 
they were awarded $19,000-20,000. (R-582). That decision 
was well within Judge Roth's discretion and the Court of 
Appeals erred in setting aside the award. 
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II. The Court of Appeals1 Decision Concerning Attorneys' 
Fees is Contrary to this Court's Prior Decisions, as 
Well as Prior Decisions of Other Panels of the Court of 
Appeals. 
A. The Court of Appeals Rejected Stacey's Express 
Contractual Right to its Attorneys' Fees While 
Recognizing Such a Right in Respondents Where None 
Exists. 
1. Stacey's Entitlement to Fees. 
The note contained a non-reciprocal attorneys1 fee 
provision in favor of Stacey granting it the right to recov-
er all attorneys1 fees and costs incurred "by or in 
connection with" its enforcement of its rights under the 
note. (See note, Exhibit "D" hereto). 
Respondents refused to make payments to Stacey un-
der the note and instead asserted "offsets" against those 
payments based upon their alleged damages. Those claimed 
offsets hemorrhaged to $88,329.21 by the time of trial, well 
in excess of the principal amount of the note. In order to 
vindicate its right to any payment under the note, Stacey 
had no choice but to challenge and defeat respondents1 
claimed offsets. Stacey was 77% percent successful in that 
regard, as it limited respondents' damages and offsets to 
$20,362.94. Thus, Stacey is entitled to 77% of its 
attorneys' fees, based upon the authority of Traynor v. 
Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (parties entitled to 
15 
share of attorneys' fees in proportion to their success); 
Cooper v. Deseret Fed, Sav. & Loan Assfn, 757 P.2d 483, 486 
(Utah App. 1988) ("[A] party is entitled . . . to those fees 
attributable to the successful vindication of contractual 
rights within the terms of the agreement.ff) • 
The Court of Appeals denied Stacey's claim by con-
cluding narrowly If[s]ince Stacey's attempt to accelerate the 
note was unsuccessful, Stacey was properly denied its attor-
neys' fees," (Court of Appeals Decision at p. 6.) That con-
clusion, however, wholly disregards that Stacey's claims 
were not simply to enforce the acceleration clause of the 
note, but to enforce respondents' monthly payment obliga-
tions. But for Stacey's largely successful defense of re-
spondents' counterclaims, respondents had announced their 
intention to make no further payments on the note and had 
effectively offset the note out of existence. Thus, even 
though Stacey was denied the right to accelerate the 
principal balance, it effectively vindicated its right to 
payment of the bulk of that principal balance by defeating 
77% of respondents claimed offsets and damages; Stacey is 
therefore entitled to at least 77% of its fees, pursuant to 
the terms of the note and the above-cited authorities. 
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Rather, the attorneys' fees which respondents seek 
to recover pursuant to the indemnity provision are the fees 
they have incurred in this action attempting to justify 
their offsets of their note payments on the grounds of 
Stacey's breaches of warranty. Clearly, such claims are not 
properly characterized as claims for "indemnification". As 
this Court observed in Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Company, 681 P.2d 214, 218 (Utah 1984), a claim for 
indemnity is different than a claim for breach of contract 
or warranty, and requires proof of three elements: (1) the 
prospective indemnitee must discharge a legal obligation to 
a third person, (2) the prospective indemnitor must be 
liable to the third person and (3) as between the indemnitee 
and the indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged by 
the indemnitor. Thus, the "indemnity" provision in the 
Letter Agreement cannot properly be invoked by respondents 
to recover their attorneys1 fees in this matter as 
respondents' claims against Stacey are not claims for 
indemnity. 
Additionally, even if respondents' claims against 
Stacey could be considered to be claims for "indemnifica-
tion" covered by § 17 of the Letter Agreement, the law is 
well-established that a prospective indemnitee cannot 
18 
2. Respondents' Entitlement to Fees, 
Neither the terms of the note nor the Letter 
Agreement contain an express attorneys' fee provision in 
favor of respondents. Instead, respondents contend, and the 
Court of Appeals agrees, that Section 17 of the Letter 
Agreement, expressly entitled "Indemnity", gives respondents 
a right to an award of their fees. (See Court of Appeals 
Opinion at p.6; See Letter Agreement at § 17, Exhibit "C" 
hereto ). That conclusion, however, is contrary to the 
decisions of this Court, other panels of the Court of 
Appeals, as well as the vast majority of other Courts which 
have considered the issue. 
Plainly, in this matter, respondents are not seek-
ing the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred by them in con-
nection with their defense of third-party claims concerning 
which they were indemnified by Stacey. If such claims were 
made against respondents, causing them to incur attorneys' 
fees, then the language of the indemnity provision at Sec-
tion 17 of the Letter Agreement clearly requires Stacey to 
pay those fees. Importantly, however, no such third-party 
claims were ever made against respondents and respondents 
never incurred any fees defending such non-existent claims. 
17 
recover its attorneys' fees incurred in establishing its 
right to indemnification. Indeed, in Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 450 (Utah App. 1988), the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that a prospective indemnitee can only 
recover attorneys' fees incurred in "defense of the claim 
indemnified against; the indemnitee is not entitled to those 
fees incurred in establishing its right to indemnity", 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted); accord Lasar v. 
Bechtal Power Corp., 727 P.2d 526, 528 (Mont. 1986); United 
General Ins. v. Crane Carrier Co., 695 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Okl. 
1984); Foley v. Employers Commercial Union, 488 P.2d 987, 
990 (Az. App. 1971). Therefore, for this additional reason, 
the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the indemnity 
provision in the Letter Agreement entitled respondents to 
their attorneys1 fees incurred in this matter. 
Finally, even if the Court of Appeals properly con-
cluded that respondents were entitled to attorneys1 fees, 
that conclusion does not negate Stacey's entitlement to its 
fees in accordance with the terms of the note. As observed 
in Traynor v. Cushing, supra, opposing parties may each be 
entitled to a share of their attorneys' fees if they both 
possess contractual rights to an award of fees and they are 
both partially successful on their claims or defenses. As 
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noted above, Stacey was 77% successful in defeating 
respondents offsets and vindicating its right to payment 
under the note and is therefore entitled to 77% of its fees, 
regardless of the validity of respondents' claims for 
attorneys f fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals1 decision fails to even pay 
lip service to the long-standing deference this Court has 
given to trial courts in setting the amount of damages. 
Such deference is appropriate in light of the trial court's 
superior position to assess the weight of the evidence and 
the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the Court of 
Appeals has seemingly misunderstood or simply declined to 
follow the law concerning the award of attorneys' fees to 
partially successful parties, as well as the construction of 
indemnity provisions. For these reasons, petitioners 
respectfully request that this Court grant their Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this [fa ^ day of / ^ ^u^c^X , 1989. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
/ 
Dbert M. 1 CA^A/* Ro Anderson 
William P. Schwartz 
50 West Broadway, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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Ben Wixen, Francine Wixen, 
Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler, 
Defendants, Respondents, 
and Cross-Appellants.• 
Before Judges Garff, Bench, and Jackson. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880127-CA 
BENCH, Judge: 
Plaintiff appeals from final judgment on an action to 
accelerate the balance due on a promissory note. Defendants 
appeal from final judgment on their counterclaim for breaches 
of warranty and contract. There are three issues presented for 
review. First, did the trial court err in dismissing 
plaintiff's claim for acceleration of the balance owed on the 
promissory note? Second, did the court err in measuring 
damages to be awarded defendants on their counterclaim? Third, 
did the court err in failing to award attorney fees? We affirm 
in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
This dispute stems from the sale in May 1984 of several 
commercial properties located in and around Ogden, Utah. 
Stacey Properties Ltd. (Stacey), a Utah limited partnership, 
and J. Ron Stacey, general partner, sold the properties to 
defendants Ben and Francine Wixen and Bernie and Bonnie Goler, 
general partners of Golwix Properties (Golwix). The total 
purchase price exceeded $3.5 million, most of which was paid 
through Golwix1s assumption of existing debt. Golwix also 
executed a promissory note in the amount of $80,000 payable in 
monthly installments to Stacey. 
The terms of the promissory note included an offset 
provision, an acceleration clause, and a provision for Stacey's 
attorney fees in the event enforcement of the note became 
necessary. In conjunction with the note, a letter agreement 
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memorializing the terms of the sale provided for, inter alia, 
express warranties on certain aspects of the properties and for 
Golwix1s attorney fees for any breach of those warranties. 
The note and agreement were executed on May 22, 1984. On 
September 5, 1984, Golwix asserted an offset against payments 
due under the note. A week later, Stacey notified Golwix that 
the entire balance due under the note was being accelerated 
because of Golwix*s "default." Stacey filed suit on December 
5, 1984, and Golwix counterclaimed. 
Trial before the court commenced on May 28, 1986. After 
three days of testimony, the trial court determined that Golwix 
had failed to make a total of $16,099.38 in payments on the 
note by the time of trial. The court further determined that 
Golwix had established offsets totaling $6,727.33 for 
replacement of an air conditioner and repair of a sewer 
system. Golwix was also awarded $12,250 in damages on its 
counterclaim for replacement of a roof. The trial court found 
that there had been no default and denied Stacey's demand to 
accelerate the balance due on the note. Neither party was 
found to be entitled to an award of attorney fees. Both 
parties appeal the judgment. 
ACCELERATION OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE 
Although an acceleration clause Mwill be enforced in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties,- KIXX, Inc. v. 
Stallion Music, Inc., 610 P.2d 1385, 1388 (Utah 1980), the 
remedy is a harsh one "not favored in the law.M Williamson v. 
Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 1976). 
Stacey contends on appeal that it should have been 
permitted to accelerate the due date of the principal balance 
of the promissory note according to the note's terms. The 
pertinent provision of the note states: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, [Stacey], at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and [Golwix] 
agree[s] to immediately pay the same. 
We examine this provision as we would a contract, since 
*[p]romissory notes . . . are contracts between the parties, 
and the rules of construction applicable to contracts apply to 
them." First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Lyarisse, 647 P.2d 1268, 
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1272 (Kan. 1982). Furthermore, "[t]he interpretation of 
contract language presents us with a question of law on which 
we need not defer to the trial court's construction but are 
free to render our independent interpretation." Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); £££ also Ted R. 
Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Stacey claims on appeal that the ruling below discourages 
unsecured loans, creates a precedent opposed to the policy of 
prompt notification of default, and weakens the enforceability 
of acceleration provisions in general. We disagree. The 
essence of the ruling of the trial court is merely that 
acceleration was premature at the time of notification and 
unwarranted later because of the amount of Golwix's offset. 
At the time Golwix notified Stacey of its offset claim, two 
of the four monthly installment payments due had been paid. 
There is testimony in the record that the parties had agreed to 
postpone payment of the initial monthly installment for one 
year. The remaining unpaid installment was due on September 1, 
1984, four days before Golwix sent notification of its offset. 
Prior to submission of its offset claim, Golwix had already 
paid or deferred three of the four installment payments due. 
On those facts, the court could reasonably find that no default 
had occurred at the time of the attempted acceleration. 
The court also found that acceleration was unwarranted 
because the amount of offsets asserted by Golwix exceeded the 
amount in arrears on the note. It is clear from the record 
that Golwix bargained for and received a contractual right of 
offset. The operative provision of the promissory note states: 
[Golwix] shall have the right to offset 
against any amounts due or to become due to 
[Stacey] under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to [Golwix] under Section 
17 of said letter agreement or under any 
other provision thereof or of any document 
executed in conjunction therewith, provided, 
however, that [Golwix] give[s] [Stacey] 
written notice of the amount to be offset 
and the specific reasons therefor. 
The trial court considered this provision along with the 
following provision of the letter agreement: 
The properties have been inspected by 
[Golwix] and are purchased "as is" . . . . 
[Stacey] agree[s] to remedy any latent 
defects in materials or workmanship which 
arise within a one year period from the date 
of closing. We represent and warrant to you 
that all heating, cooling, electrical, 
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plumbing and sewer systems at the properties 
are in working order and will be operative 
at closing and that the footings and 
foundations are free from material 
structural defects. . . . We will perform 
all necessary repairs to the roof of the 
Post Office building which are reasonably 
required to maintain a water tight roof 
surface for a period of sixty seven [sic] 
months from the date of closing at our sole 
cost and expense. 
When Golwix incurred a $22/758 expense to replace an air 
conditioner/ it referred to the warranty provision of the 
letter agreement and exercised its contractual offset right 
under the promissory note. These two instruments could be 
reasonably construed together. Verhoef v. Aston, 740 P.2d 
1342/ 1344 (Utah App. 1987) (agreements which are related and 
executed contemporaneously must be construed as a whole and 
harmonized). The trial court could also properly balance the 
acceleration and offset terms of the note# giving effect to 
each of the provisions of the entire agreement. Minshew v. 
Chevron Oil Co., 575 P.2d 192/ 194 (Utah 1978) (contractual 
provisions must be interpreted in light of the entire 
agreement/ giving effect to every other provision). We 
conclude that the trial court was legally correct in holding 
that acceleration was unwarranted because the offset exceeded 
the total payments due on the note. See, e.g., Wells v. Cobb, 
455 So.2d 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (acceleration was 
improper where default had not occurred due to offset). 
Accordingly/ acceleration was unwarranted prior to trial/ and 
we affirm the ruling of the trial court.1 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES ON COUNTERCLAIM 
Stacey argues that the trial court erred in measuring 
damages to be awarded Golwix on its counterclaim. Much of the 
trial record is devoted to establishing the timing/ cost, and 
extent of repairs needed on the various sale properties. Based 
on the factual findings, the trial court determined as a matter 
of law that Stacey was liable on only three of Golwix1s claimed 
offsets. The court found that: 1) Stacey had breached its 
contract to maintain a watertight roof at the post office 
property; 2) Stacey had breached its warranty that the cooling 
system at the post office was to be operative on the closing 
date; and 3) Stacey had breached its warranty to remedy any 
latent defects in materials or workmanship by failing to remedy 
a defect in the sewer system at the shopping center property. 
1. We need not reach the issue as to whether acceleration was 
warranted at the time of trial since the court's award to Golwix 
still exceeded the amount in arrears on the note even at that 
time. 
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Although the court awarded a dollar-for-dollar reimbursement of 
the sewer repairs, the replacement costs for the roof and air 
conditioner were apportioned 25% to Stacey and 75% to Golwix. 
This apportionment is at issue on appeal• 
Damages recoverable in a breach of contract action are 
generally "those which arise naturally from the breach and 
which reasonably may be supposed to have been within the 
contemplation of the parties or are reasonably foreseeable." 
Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah 1982).2 "Damages 
are properly measured by the amount necessary to place the 
nonbreaching party in as good a position as if the contract had 
been performed." Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 
1982). 
A review of the amounts awarded to Golwix for the roof 
leads us to conclude that this rule was properly applied. The 
trial court's apportionment of the costs for roof replacement 
was based on evidence in the record that a new twenty-year roof 
would cost $49,000. Since Stacey had contracted to maintain 
the roof for approximately five years, the court reasonably 
found that Stacey should bear the cost of five years of a 
twenty-year roof, i.e., 25% of $49,000, or $12,250. 
The trial court likewise apportioned the actual replacement 
cost of the air conditioner. Golwix was awarded 25% of the 
replacement cost of $22,758, or $5,689.50. The court held that 
Golwix would "receive a windfall" if Stacey was held 
responsible for the full replacement cost. The award, however, 
fails to "place the nonbreaching party in as good a position as 
if the contract had been performed." Alexander, 646 P.2d at 
695. Golwix contracted for a cooling system that was to be 
operable on the day of closing. What it received was an air 
conditioner that was not in working order on that date. Since 
the evidence indicates that the reasonable cost of repairing 
the unit would have been between $19,000 and $20,000, the 
court's award was insufficient to afford Golwix the benefit of 
its bargain. For that reason, the award for the air 
conditioner should be increased, on remand, to reflect the 
reasonable cost of repair. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Both parties sought, and were denied, attorney fees under 
provisions of the promissory note and letter agreement. Stacey 
based its claim for attorney fees on the following provision of 
the promissory note: 
2. We do not distinguish the breach of warranty claim from the 
breach of contract claim as "[a]n action for breach of warranty 
may sound in either contract or tort." Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1985). 
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[Golwix] agree[s] to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular 
nature thereof and whether incurred with or 
without suit or before or after judgment/ 
including reasonable attorneys' fees) which 
may be incurred by or in connection with the 
enforcement or performance of any of the 
rights of [Stacey] hereunder or under any 
agreement, instrument or document connected 
with or related to this Note. 
Golwix based its claim for fees on the following provision 
of the letter agreement: 
[Stacey] agree[s] to indemnify . . . and 
reimburse you . . . for . . . any claim 
. . . (including without limitation " 
reasonable attorneys* fees and expenses/ and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred/ in 
investigating/ preparing or defending 
against any litigation or claim), . . . 
arising out of or in any manner incident/ 
relating or attributable to: a. any breach 
or failure of any representation or warranty 
given by us . . . ; b. any failure of 
either of us to perform or observe . . . any 
covenant, agreement/ or condition to be 
performed or observed by us under this 
agreement or under any . . . other 
instrument . . . executed by us in 
connection with this agreement; . . . or 
d. the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
As a general rule, attorney fees may be recovered in Utah 
only if provided for by statute or contract. Cooper v. Deseret 
Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483/ 486 (Utah App. 1988). 
If attorney fees are recoverable by contract/ H[a] party is 
entitled only to those fees attributable to the successful 
vindication of contractual rights, within the terms of [the] 
agreement.- Travner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856/ 858 (Utah 1984). 
The court below found that Stacey was not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees because it did not prevail on its 
complaint for acceleration. We consider this finding to be in 
accord with the language of the note, i.e., Golwix will pay 
attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of Stacey's 
rights under the note. Since Stacey's attempt to accelerate 
the note was unsuccessful/ Stacey was properly denied its 
attorney fees. 
In regards to Golwix's claim for attorney fees# the trial 
court found that it was Mnot entitled to an award of fees 
because [it] did not prevail on many of [its] counterclaims." 
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The letter agreement provides, however, for the reimbursement 
of Golwix1s attorney fees incurred in enforcing any claims for 
breach of warranty or failure of performance. The contractual 
provision is expansively written, encompassing a broad range of 
potential expenses connected with rights arising under the 
contract. The mere fact that Golwix failed to prevail on some 
of their counterclaims does not justify a withholding of fees 
to which they were contractually entitled. "Provisions in 
written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should 
ordinarily be honored by the courts." Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (Utah 1983). Golwix was not only successful in its 
opposition to acceleration of the note, it was also successful 
on some of its counterclaims. Therefore, even with partial 
success, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees for the claims on 
which it was successful. See Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each 
party was entitled to attorney fees where each was partially 
successful). We conclude that the trial court abused its 
discretion in failing to give effect to the broad contractual 
language and partial success of Golwix in enforcing its 
contractual rights. 
The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. The case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to Golwix. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CON' 
Re^ftfrtTlf. Garff , Judge 
- ^ ^ > < 2 ^ ^ 
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J. RON STACEY, 
Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
This matter, having been tried to the Court on May 28, 
29, and 30, 1986, and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey having been 
represented by Robert M. Anderson and William p. Schwartz, and 
defendants having been represented by Clark Waddoups and Ronald 
G. Russell, and the Court, having heard the evidence and argument 
of counsel, hereby makes the following findings and conclusions: 
PINDINGS OP PACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAW 
Civil No. 90743 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 22, 1984, plaintiff Stacey Properties, 
counterclaim defendant J. Ron Stacey, and defendants Ben Wixen, 
Francine Wixen, Bernie Goler, and Bonnie Goler entered into a 
written agreement (the "Agreement") whereby certain properties 
were sold by plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey to defendants, including 
the main Ogden post office located in Ogden, Utah, and the 
Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in Sunset, Utah. 
2. As partial payment for the properties, defendants 
executed an $80,000 promissory note dated May 22, 1984, payable 
to plaintiff in monthly installments of $731.79, beginning on 
June 1, 1984 (the "Note"). 
3. Defendants paid to plaintiff $744.60 on August 1, 
1984; and $731.79 on August 29, 1984. 
4. The Note contains a provision concerning offsets 
which states: 
Contemporaneous with Makers' execution of 
this Note, Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey 
("Stacey") have executed a letter agreement 
relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber 
Counties, State of Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 
of said letter agreement, Properties and Stacey 
agree to indemnify, defend, and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand from 
and against, for, and with respect to inter alia, 
any claim, liability or obligation relating ro 
attributable to any breach of failure of any 
representation or warranty given by Properties 
and Stacey contained in the letter agreement 
or any failure of either of 
-2-
them to perform any covenant to be performed 
under such agreement or any such instrument. 
Makers shall have the right to offset against 
any amounts due or to become due to 
Properties under this Note any such 
reimbursement due to Makers under Section 17 
of said letter agreement or under any other 
provision thereof . . ., provided, however, 
that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific 
reasons therefor. 
5. On September 5, 1984, defendants sent written 
notice to plaintiff asserting an offset against amounts due or to 
become due under the Note for expenses incurred by defendants in 
replacing an air-conditioning unit at the Ogden post office. The 
amount and specific reasons for the offset were stated in that 
letter. 
6. Defendants did not make the September, 1984 
monthly payment under the Note and made no payments under the 
Note after claiming said offset. As of May 1, 1986, the total of 
unpaid installments under the Note was $16,099.38. 
7. Plaintiff sent a letter to defendants on September 
12, 1984 asserting that it was accelerating the entire balance 
due and owing under the Note and further asserting that 
defendants had failed to make payments in th-» time and manner 
required by the Note. The Note provides: 
In the event this Note, or any obligation 
provided to be satisfied or performed under 
any agreement, instrument or document 
connected with or related to this Note, now 
existing or otherwise, is breached or is not 
satisfied, performed or paid, at the time and 
in the manner required, Properties, at its 
option and without notice, may declare the 
unpaid principal balance and accrued interest 
immediately due and payable and makers agree 
to immediately pay the same. 
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8. The Agreement provides: 
[Stacey Properties and J. Ron Stacey] agree 
to remedy any latent defects in materials or 
woxfkmanship which arise within a one year 
period from the date of closing. We 
represent and warrant to you that all 
heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and 
sewer systems at the properties are in 
working order and will be operative at 
closing . . . ., We will perform all necessary 
repairs to the roof of the Ogden post office 
building which are reasonably required to 
maintain a watertight roof surface for a 
period of sixty-seven months from the date of 
closing at our sole cost and expense. 
9. At trial, defendants claimed offsets against the 
Note for the following items and amounts: 
(a) Ogden Post Office Air 
Conditioner Replacement $25,063.80 
(b) Commonwealth Sewer Repair $ 1,037.83 
(c) Ogden Post Office Roof $43,750.00 
(d) Commonwealth Sidewalk Repair $ 7,600.00 
(e) Commonwealth Electrical Repair $ 1,409.70 
(f) Property Tax Adjustment $ 3,028.52 
(g) Commonwealth Fire Sprinkler $ 1,190.00 
10. Defendants provided plaintiff with written notice 
of each claimed offset, which notice stated the amounts claimed 
and reasons therefor. 
11. According to the evidence presented, the Court's 
findings regarding the offsets claimed by defendants are as 
follows: 
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a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The air-conditioning unit, according 
to the circumstantial evidence presented, was 
not in working order and was not operative on 
May 22, 1984; 
(2) The air-conditioning unit had an 
expected useful life of approximately fifteen 
years; 
(3) On May 22, 1984, the unit would have 
had approximately 25% of its useful life 
remaining under normal conditions; 
(4) Plaintiff was notified by Eugene 
Perren of the post office by at least May 29, 
1984 that the air-conditioning unit was not 
operable. Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed 
to make repairs to the unit after receiving 
notice from the post office that the unit was 
inoperable; 
(5) Defendants incurred a total expense 
of $22,758.00 to replace the air-conditioning 
unit, the first installment of which in the 
amount of $6,000 was paid on August 21, 1984. 
b. Commonwealth Square Sewer System. 
(1) Defendants discovered a 16"-18" gap 
in a sewer pipe at Commonwealth Square within 
one year of Kay 22, 1984, which gap was never 
remedied by plaintiff or J. Ron Stacey. 
(2) The subject gap was not discovered 
prior to closing and could not have been 
discovered by a reasonable inspection due to 
its nature and location; 
(3) Defendants incurred an expense of 
$1,037.83 to repair said gap. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) The Ogden post office roof has 
leaked on numerous occasions following 
closing and plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain a 
watertight roof surface; 
(2) According to the evidence presented 
by defendants, the cost of replacing the post 
office roof with a new "twenty year" roof 
would be $49,000; 
(3) The age of the roof at the date of 
closing was approximately twelve years; 
(4) Defendants have not incurred any 
out-of-pocket expenses to repair said roof as 
of the time of trial. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk. 
(1) The sidewalks at Commonwealth Square 
are currently in a defective condition in 
several places; 
(2) The defects were discoverable by 
defendants prior to May 22, 1984; 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the 
Commonwealth electrical system was not in 
working order at the date of closing, 
f• Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Defendants failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that plaintiff owed 
defendants additional amounts pursuant to the 
parties1 agreement to adjust the property 
taxes payable by the parties according to the 
actual 1984 tax assessment. 
(2) Plaintiff moved at the start of 
trial to amend its Complaint to include a 
claim for the property tax proration owed 
plaintiff by defendants, which motion was 
granted. 
(3) Defendants have failed to make 
payment to plaintiff of $958.10 for which the 
tenants at Commonwealth were responsible and 
for which plaintiff claimed a pro-rata 
credit. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants failed to present any 
evidence that the fire sprinkling system at 
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Commonwealth Square was not in working order 
at the date of closing, 
12, These Findings of Fact shall be construed to 
Conclusions of Law to the extent that same may be found to 
constitute Conclusions of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
13. The Court makes the following conclusions wit 
respect to each of the claimed offsets: 
a. Post Office Air-Conditioning Unit. 
(1) The east air-conditioning unit at 
the Ogden post office was not in working 
order and operative on May 22, 1984 in breach 
of the terms of the Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of 
replacement; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $5,689.50, which is 
25% of the total replacement cost of the air 
conditioner incurred by defendants, together 
with prejudgment interest on that amount at 
12% per annum from August 21, 1984 to May 30, 
1986 or $1,209.89. 
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b. Commonwealth Sewer System. 
(1) A latent defect in the sewer system 
at Commonwealth Square Shopping Center arose 
within one year from May 22, 1984, which 
defect plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey failed to 
remedy in breach of the terms of the 
Agreement. 
(2) Defendants are entitled to offset 
against amounts due or to become due under 
the Note the amount of $1,037.83 for costs 
incurred by defendants to repair said sewer 
system, together with pre-judgment interest 
on that amount from January 1, 1985 to May 
30, 1986 or $175.72. 
c. Ogden Post Office Roof. 
(1) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey have 
failed to perform all necessary repairs which 
were reasonably required to maintain the 
Ogden post office roof in a watertight 
condition in breach of the terms of the 
Agreement; 
(2) Defendants would receive a windfall 
if plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey were held 
responsible for the entire cost of a new 
roof; 
(3) Defendants are entitled to recover 
against plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey an award 
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of damages proximately resulting from said breach 
in the amount of $12,250, which is 25% of the 
cost of a new "twenty-year" roof; 
(4) Because defendants had incurred no 
out-of-pocket expenses with respect to said roof 
prior to trial, no offset against the Note arose 
under Paragraph 17 of the Agreement and the Note. 
(5) Plaintiff and J. Ron Stacey shall have no 
further obligations under the Agreement with 
respect to the Ogden post office roof from and 
after May 30, 1986. 
d. Commonwealth Square Sidewalk, 
(1) The defects claimed by defendants with 
respect to the Commonwealth Square Shopping 
Center were not latent defects within the terras 
of the agreement; 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any award 
with respect to said sidewalks. 
e. Commonwealth Electrical System. 
(1) The defendants have failed to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth 
electrical system was not in working order on May 
22, 1984. 
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(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said electrical system. 
f. Property Tax Adjustment. 
(1) Pursuant to the Agreement, plaintiff 
and J, Ron Stacey are entitled to recover 
$958.10 from defendants jointly and 
severally, together with prejudgment interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from January 1, 
1985 to May 30, 1986 in the amount of 
$162.22, as a pro-rata credit for property 
taxes which were paid or should have been 
paid to defendants by certain tenants. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to property taxes. 
g. Commonwealth Fire Sprinkling System. 
(1) Defendants presented no evidence 
that the Commonwealth fire sprinkling system 
was not in working order at the date of 
closing. 
(2) Defendants are not entitled to any 
award with respect to said system. 
14. The time at which a default justifying 
acceleration is measured is at the time of the attempted 
acceleration. No default had occurred on September 12, 1984 
justifying acceleration and the attempted acceleration by 
plaintiff was of no effect. 
15. Plaintiff was not entitled to accelerate the Note 
at the time the complaint was filed because the payments made by 
the defendants to replace the subject air conditioner exceeded 
amounts due under the Note on that date. 
lfi. Acceleration is a harsh remedy and the plaintiff 
is not entitled to acceleration as of the date of trial for the 
additional reason that acceleration should not be dependent upon 
the uncertainties of delays in bringing a case to trial, 
17. Because defendants are entitled to a money 
judgment with respect to damages awarded for breach of the 
agreement to maintain the post office roof, acceleration of the 
Note at this time would be inappropriate. 
18. The total amount awarded to defendants, including 
prejudgment interest, is to be offset against the cumulative 
monthly installments under the Note of $16,099.38 (as of May 1, 
1986) and against future installments under the Note until such 
amount has been fully satisfied. 
19. Pursuant to stipulation, defendants' Fourth 
Counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
20. Plaintiff did not prevail on its complaint for 
acceleration and is therefore not entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
21. The defendants would be entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees if they had simply defended the case 
successfully, but are not entitled to an award of fees because 
they did not prevail on many of their counterclaims. 
22. All parties shall bear their own costs. 
23. These Conclusions of Law shal l be construed to be 
Findings of Pact to the extent that the same may be found to 
c o n s t i t u t e Finflings of Fact . -c-y^^^.. 
DATED t h i s /*> day of ^ d g u s t , 1986. 
BY THE COORT: 
'-driage David E. Roth 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert M. Anderson of 
Hansen and Anderson 
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f 
and i , Ron Stacey 
Roffa^d G. RuSSeipol 
Lar^en, Kimball, Parr & Crockett 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimaints 
- i i -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of August 1986, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-delivered to: 
Robert M. Anderson, Esq. 
William P. Schwartz, Esq. 
HANSEN & ANDERSON 
Valley Tower Building 
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
May 1, 1984 
Mr. Ben Wixen 
Ms. Francine A. Wixen 
Dr. Bernie Goler 
Ms. Bonnie Goler 
1911 South Commerce Center, E. 
Suite 211 
San Bernadino. California 92408 
Dear Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Dr. and Ms. Goler: 
This letter is written to set forth the terms of our 
agreement this date relating to the sale by Stacey Properties, 
a Utah Limited Partnership, and me to you as tenants in common. 
1. Property Sold 
The properties to be sold include the following: 
a. Commonwealth Square Shopping Center, Units 
1-18, inclusive. 
b. Pizza Hut, Ogden, Utah. 
c. Eastern Winds Restaurant, Ogden, Utah. 
d. Jiffy Lube Center, Ogden, Utah 
e. Post Office Building, Ogden, Utah. 
All of the said properties are more fully described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. The properties have been 
inspected by you and are purchased "as is". Said buildings 
vary from the plans, specifications and building contracts 
being delivered to you only as set forth on Exhibit B attached 
hereto and in other minor ways which do not materially affect 
the said properties. We agree to remedy any latent defects in 
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materials or workmanship which arise within a one year period 
from the date of closing. We represent and warrant to you that 
all heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sewer systems at 
the properties are in working order and will be operative at 
closing and that the footings and foundations are free from 
material structural defects. We further warrant to you that 
the roof at the Eastern Winds and Pizza Hut Restaurants are 
free of any defects in workmanship and material and we warrant 
that we will make any reasonably necessary repairs to said 
roofs required at any time within five years from the date of 
closing which arise as a direct result of defects in 
workmanship or materials. We further warrant to you that the 
roof at Commonwealth Square is free of any defects in 
workmanship and material and we warrant that we will make any 
reasonably necessary repairs to said roof required at any time 
within one year from the date of closing which arise as a 
direct result of defects in workmanship or materials. We will 
perform all necessary repairs to the roof of the Post Office 
building which are reasonably required to maintain a water 
tight roof surface for a period of sixty seven months from the 
date of closing at our sole cost and expense. 
2. Purchase Price 
The purchase price for all of the foregoing property 
is a total of $3,530,104.95. We will pay sales taxes directly 
attributable to the sale of personal property sold to you 
hereunder. The said purchase price is payable according to the 
following terms and at the times indicated: 
a. $10,000 cash paid this date, to our 
attorneys, Berman & Anderson, to be held in their 
trust account. 
b. The sum of $242,000.00 to be paid at the 
time of closing in cash funds (said amount to be 
increased or reduced for any reduction or increase, 
respectively, in the amount set forth in (e) hereafter 
which occurs prior to closing or for prorations set 
forth in paragraph 4). 
c. The sum of $80,000 evidenced by a promissory 
note payable to Stacey Properties in the form set 
forth in Exhibit "C" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. 
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d. The sum of $2,900,000.00 paid to First 
Security Bank in accordance with the terms of a loan 
transaction set forth in detail in a letter from First 
Security Bank of Utah to each of you dated March 27, 
1984. First Security Bank will require and you agree 
to execute a deed of trust.and promissory note in form 
acceptable to the bank which said documents will be in 
accordance with the terms of your separate agreement 
with the bank dated March 27, 1984. 
e. Assumption of Post Office building mortgage 
in the amount of approximately $298,104.95 to State 
Savings and Loan Association which you will assume and 
agree to pay. 
3. Conveyance 
The properties shall be conveyed, an undivided 
one-half interest to Dr. and Mrs. Goler and an undivided 
one-half interest as part of a Section 1031 exchange 
transaction involving Mr. and Mrs. Wixen and Val Ban Corp., 
each conveyance by a general warranty deed from the Sellers to 
the grantees. 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have the right, without the 
need of any further approval or consent of us prior to the 
completion of the purchase of the subject property to transfer 
and assign all of their rights and obligations under this 
agreement to Val Ban Corp., a California corporation. 
Val Ban Corp.. pursuant to the contractual obligation 
to purchase the subject property hereunder in accordance with 
the terms and provisions of that certain agreement of exchange 
entered into between Mr. and Ms. Wixen and Val Ban Corp. on 
July 12, 1983, shall complete said purchase according to the 
terms set forth in said agreement. Upon such assignment having 
been made by Mr. and Ms. Wixen and upon our receipt of written 
notice of the same, Mr. and Ms. Wixen shall have no further 
rights, obligations, or liabilities hereunder, all such rights, 
obligations and liabilities having been fully transferred and 
assigned to Val Ban Corp. Upon the conveyance of the undivided 
one-half interest in the properties from Val Ban Corp. to 
Mr. and Ms. Wixen, Val Ban Corp. shall be released by us from 
its obligations under the promissory note (referred to in 
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paragraph 2(c) above, provided that Mr. and Ms. Wixen assume 
such promissory note obligation. 
4. Prorations and Closing Costs 
The rents, taxes, insurance, and utilities will be 
prorated as of the date of closing and appropriate credits of 
debits made to each of us. Taxes will be prorated on the basis 
of 1983 property taxes with a final adjustment to be made in 
November, 1984, at such time as the exact amount of 1984 taxes 
is known. It is contemplated that you will make similar 
adjustments with First Security Bank of Utah relating to the 
proration of rents. We will pay costs of recording deeds to 
you and the loan fee to First Security Bank in the approximate 
amount of $14,500. We and you will share equally the escrow 
fee. Each of the parties hereto will bear their own attorney's 
fees and costs for preparation of this agreement and in 
connection with the closing. 
5. Leases 
We heretofore delivered to you true, correct and 
complete originals of all tenant leases pertaining to the 
properties being sold to you. Such leases are valid and 
binding documents and are in full force and effect. Except for 
such leases, there are no other agreements in connection with 
leasing of said property between us and such tenants with 
respect to the properties. No party thereunder has any right, 
with the giving of notice or lapse of time or both, to 
terminate any lease or assert any claim thereunder, except as 
set forth in said leases. At the closing, we will by 
instrument satisfactory to you transfer, convey and assign to 
you all of our interest in said leases, including the right to 
receive rents thereunder. Prior to the closing, we will obtain 
for you letters from said tenants confirming the leases, and 
prepaid rents and in addition we will prepare and execute a 
joint letter advising the tenants of the transfer of ownership 
to you and directing such tenants to pay rents to you. Such 
transfer will not constitute a default under any of such 
leases. We will resolve any differences asserted by said 
tenants as it relates to prepaid rents or offsets claimed 
against future rentals becoming due under the terms of the said 
leases, and pay you for the amount of any such difference. 
Prepaid rents and security deposits will be accounted for and 
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paid to you at closing and you will be obligated for such 
deposits in accordance with the terms of said leases. 
6. Personal Property 
At the time of closing a bill of sale without 
warranties evidencing the sale by us to you of the equipment 
and personal property located at the Eastern Winds Restaurant, 
a complete list of which is set forth on Exhibit MD" attached 
hereto, will be provided to you relating to such equipment and 
personal property. 
7. Preliminary Title Reports 
We have delivered to you this date copies of 
Preliminary Title Reports prepared by Home Abstract Company 
relating to the properties being sold, together with copies of 
various documents which are referred to in the said title 
reports. We represent and warrant that, except for those 
matters explicitly described in such Preliminary Title Reports, 
there are no liens, claims or encumbrances existing or which, 
based on facts existing prior to the closing, may be asserted 
against any of the properties. The proposed Section 1031 
exchange transaction will be closed through Home Abstract 
Company. An ALTA Owner*s Extended Coverage Title Policy in the 
amount of $3,530,104.95 will be provided to you through Home 
Abstract Company at our expense. 
8. Allocation of Values 
The allocation of the purchase price of the respective 
properties being sold by us to you will be set forth in a 
Schedule approved by all parties at closing. 
9. Commissions 
We have made arrangements to pay Century 21 Harmston 
Realtors and Wixen Realty, a commission in the total amount of 
$38,000 with Wixen Realty to receive 50* thereof, in connection 
with the sale and you are not responsible for payment of any 
commission in connection with the subject transaction. 
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10. Warranties 
At closing we will assign to you all contract 
warranties from third parties pertaining to the subject 
properties as they relate to any personal property, the 
structures, or any component parts thereof and we will make a 
reasonable effort to locate and deliver copies of all documents 
in our files with respect thereto. In addition, we will 
deliver to you at closing all original building contracts, 
plans, permits, and other documents pertaining to the 
properties purchased or the construction of same. We have 
advised you most of the properties were constructed without 
written building contracts. 
11. Possession 
Possession of the properties being sold shall be 
delivered at the date of closing. 
12. Closing Date 
The closing date of this transaction and "closing" as 
used herein shall be May 4, 1984, or as said date shall be 
extended by mutual agreement between us. In the event said 
closing does not occur on said date or on the date of extension 
of the closing as mutually agreed to between us, each party 
shall have all remedies provided for by law. 
13. Representations 
We have previously represented to you and we hereby 
affirm, to the best of our knowledge and belief, that the 
subject properties are in compliance with all applicable 
building rules and regulations, and there are no violations of 
any statutes or judicial orders pertaining to the subject 
properties. The subject properties are in compliance with all 
applicable zoning rules and regulations. There are no judicial 
orders specifically pertaining to the subject properties. We 
have provided you with copies of any special permits or 
conditional use permits relating to operation of the subject 
properties. There are no lawsuits, administrative proceedings, 
arbitrations or other proceedings pertaining to the subject 
properties or affecting such properties and to the best of our 
knowledge none have been threatened and there are no 
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governmental investigations relating thereto. In the event 
suit is filed by any third party to enjoin closing of the 
transaction or to rescind the sale transaction, we will defend 
said action at our sole cost and expense. 
Stacey Properties is a Utah limited partnership which 
has been duly formed and is validly existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and has all powers and authorities and all 
material governmental licenses, authorizations, consents and 
approvals required to carry on the business as now conducted by 
it, to own the properties being sold hereunder, to enter into 
this agreement, to execute and deliver the bill of sale, the 
deeds and the assignments contemplated hereby and to perform 
all of its obligations hereunder and thereunder. J. Ron Stacey 
is the owner of the Commonwealth Square property. The 
execution, delivery and performance by us of this agreement are 
within our power, have been duly authorized by all necessary 
action, require no action by or in respect of. or filing with. 
any partner or any governmental body, agency or official or any 
other party and do not contravene, or constitute a default 
under, any provision of applicable law or regulation or of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed or of any 
agreement, judgment, injunction, order, decree or other 
instrument binding upon us or result in the creation or 
imposition of any lien, charge, encumbrance or security 
interest on any of the properties being sold hereunder. We 
have delivered to you true and complete copies of all of the 
documents by which we were created and are governed which are 
valid and binding and are in full force and effect. We have 
not entered into any contract with any person to manage the 
properties or operate any portion thereof. 
14. Termite Inspection 
At the closing we will provide you with a standard 
inspection certificate indicating no terminate infestation 
issued by a recognized exterminator following inspection of the 
properties sold hereunder. 
15. Survey 
At the closing we will furnish to you surveys prepared 
by a registered surveyor showing the properties being sold and 
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the location of buildings thereon, the location of any streets, 
rights of way. or rights of access. 
16. Conditions 
(i) Your obligation to purchase the properties is 
expressly conditioned upon the following: 
a. That you obtain a loan from First Security 
Bank of Utah in accordance with the terms set forth in 
the letter from First Security to you dated March 27. 
1984. or as said loan is amended or altered by mutual 
agreement between you and the bank; 
b. That all representations and warranties made 
by us shall be true and correct on and as of the date 
of closing as if made on such date; 
c. That we shall have fully performed and 
complied with all of the obligations to be performed 
by us in this agreement; 
d. That you shall have received an opinion from 
our attorneys. Berman & Anderson, in the form set 
forth on Exhibit "E" hereto; 
e. That the assumption of the Post Office 
building mortgage has been approved by State Savings 
and Loan Association and the interest rate thereon 
shall not exceed 11 1/2% per annum; and 
f. That there shall have been no material 
adverse change in any of the properties or title 
thereto since April 1. 1984. 
(ii) Our obligation to sell the properties 
is expressly conditioned upon the following: 
(a) That First Security Bank release us from all of 
our obligations and liabilities to said Bank; 
(b) That you shall have fully performed and complied 
with all of the obligations to be performed by you in this 
agreement; 
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(c) That J. Ron Stacey and Geraldine Stacey shall be 
released from any liability to State Savings and Loan 
Association arising in connection with the Post Office mortgage 
being assumed by you. 
17. Indemnity 
We agree to indemnify, defend and hold you harmless 
and reimburse you on demand from and against, for, and with 
respect to any claim, liability, obligation, loss, damage, 
deficiency, assessment, judgment, cost or expense (including 
without limitation reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses, and 
costs and expenses reasonably incurred, in investigating, 
preparing or defending against any litigation or claim), 
action, suit, proceeding or demand, of any kind or character, 
arising out of or in any manner incident, relating or 
attributable to: 
a. any breach or failure of any representation 
or warranty given by us contained in this agreement or 
in any certificate, instrument, assignment, conveyance 
or transfer, or other document or agreement executed 
by either of us in connection with this agreement; 
b. any failure of either of us to perform or 
observe, or to have performed or observed, in full, 
any covenant, agreement, or condition to be performed 
or observed by us under this agreement or under any 
certificate or other instrument, document or agreement 
executed by us in connection with this agreement; 
c. the assertion by any person of any claim, 
liability, obligation, agreement or undertaking which 
relates to the properties or which in any manner 
affects title to the properties which arises out of 
any facts, transactions or circumstances occurring on 
or prior to the closing date; or 
de the enforcement of your rights under this 
agreement. 
18. Survival. 
The representations, warranties and covenants given by 
us contained herein and the certificates delivered at the 
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closing or otherwise delivered pursuant to this agreement, 
shall survive the closing without regard to any investigation 
made by you. 
19. Waiver and Modification. 
This agreement may not be amended, modified, 
superseded or cancelled, and none of the terms, covenants, 
representations, warranties or conditions, may be waived except 
by written instrument executed by all of us and for. or. in the 
case of a waiver, by the party waiving compliance. Failure of 
any party at any time or times to require strict performance of 
any provision hereof shall not in any manner affect the right 
of such party at a later date to enforce the same. No waiver 
by any party of the breach of any term, covenant, 
representation or warranty contained in this agreement as a 
condition to such party1s obligations hereunder, shall 
constitute a release or affect any liability resulting from 
said breach. 
20. Successors in Interest; Assignment. 
This agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the successors and assigns of the parties. Except 
as provided herein, no assignment of any rights and delegations 
of any obligations for which provision is made in this 
agreement may be made by any party without the prior written 
consent of the other party. 
If the foregoing sets forth the terms of our 
understanding* please execute this agreement where set forth 
below. 
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C^Lcepted and agreed to this 
Z-lLday pt Aprils 1984. 
Ben Wixen 
= *-l W i x e n ^ Francine Wixen 
&^d 
Bernie Goler 




May 25, 1984 
The Undersign hereby agrees to be liable as co-makers of that certain Promisory 
Note, as said Note as been modified by interlineations and additions previously 
agreed to by Val Ban Corp., Bernie and Bonnie Goler. 
A photo copy of said Note ( reflecting such modification is attached hereto as 
Ehibit "A11. 
^ * ^ ^ ^(JflO 





$80f000.00 Salt Lake City, Utah 
May 2^1984 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Makers") promise 
to pay to the order of STACEY PROPERTIES, a Utah limited 
partnership ("Properties'1), or its assigns, the principal sura of 
Eighty Thousand Dollars ($80,000.00), together with interest on 
said principal sum, or the unpaid balance thereof, from and after 
the date hereof, at the rate of ten and one-half percent (10 
1/22) p^r annum. Principal and interest shall be paid in monthly 
installments of $731.79 each, payable on the first day of each 
month commencing June 1, 1984. Payments shall be applied first 
to accrued interest with the remainder applied to principal. The 
entire principal balance.and all accrued interest shall be due 
and payable on the 1st day of May, 1994. 
Contemporaneous with Makers9 execution of this Note, 
Makers, Properties and J. Ron Stacey ("Stacey") have executed a 
letter agreement relating to the sale and purchase of certain 
parcels of realty located in Davis and Weber Counties, State of 
Utah. Pursuant to Section 17 of said letter agreement, 
Properties and Stacey agree to indemnify, defend and hold Makers 
harmless and to reimburse Makers on demand*from and against, for, 
and with respect to, inter alia, any claim, liability or 
obligation relating or attributable to any breach or failure of 
any representation or warranty given by Properties and Stacey 
contained in the letter agreement or any instrument executed by 
either of them in connection therewith or any failure of either 
of them to perform any covenant to be performed under such 
agreement or any such instrument. Makers shall have the right to 
offset against any amounts due or to become due to Properties 
under this Note any such reimbursement due to Makers under 
Section 17 of said letter agreement or under any other provision 
thereof or of any document executed in conjunction therewith, 
provided, however, that Makers give Properties written notice of 
the amount to be offset and the specific reasons therefor. 
In the event this Note, or any obligation provided to 
be satisfied or performed under any agreement, instrument or 
document connected with or related to this Note, now existing or 
otherwise, is breached or is not satisfied, performed or paid, at 
the time and in the manner required, Properties, at its option 
and without rtbtice, may declare the unpaid principal balance and 
accrued interest immediately due. and payable and Makers agree to 
immediately pay the same. Makers agree to pay any and all costs 
and expenses (regardless of the particular nature thereof and 
the leasing.of any and a l l portions of the Center to-.Tarants for 
purposes of Occupancy by Tenants 
whether incurred with or without s u i t or oexore or a f ter 
Judgment, l a d u d i n t reasonable attorneya* f ee t ) which say bo 
incurrad by or i n connection with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the righta 'of Properties hereunder or undar any 
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to 
t h i s Vote. Zf principal or intereat owing hereunder ara not paid 
when due, intereat s h a l l thereafter accrue oa the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of e ighteen percent (181) per 
annum, both before and after Judgment. The ent ire balanee of 
principal and intereat owing hereunder shal l mature and be 
payable i n the event of aale or transfer by Makers of a l l or any . 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Canter located i n Alk/j 
Sunset, Utah ("the Center"), provided, however, that {\ykti4. /jOf/l 
tft/tf?f/fanftip% (2) tho transfer of a l l or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other ent i ty which i s 
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a l inea l descendant hV 
ett44*v?£'of Makera or any one of them, 44 (3) the transfer to a 
spouse,o z l ineal descendant ui •iiiieaiur of a Maker or to a t rus t 
naming a Maker or a spouseprl ineal descendant AWM^ftAV of a 
Maker aa a beneficiary, *shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity data for payment of pr inc ipa l and intereat owing 
hereunder. The term "control** means ownership of more than £xf£$fa* hun 
pereent 630Z) of the capita l of a. partnership or unincorporated / ; / \ / / Jlr\ / 
"entity orwvttie ownership of more than UAfH. pareent (JJMT.) of a l l AlL^(/', 
classes of stock of a corporation. °rM Amazed ISO! ^ 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of t h i s Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Fropertiee deterainea that i t w i l l s e l l or 
discount this Hots, and i f Makers are not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties s h a l l o f f e r the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms aet forth in said of far. 
This Mote i s executed i n connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the l e t t e r agreement above-mentioned and certa in 
other written agreements entered i n t o between Makers, Fropertiee 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated in to 
and by reference made a part of t h i s Note. 
* th« «.!• ~ . < — * w w ,. ~* v**« **» C0RP« • * California tne sale or transfer by Makers of coraor i t ion 
unit 18 in the Center (provided, however ,JTV,
 W lf\ / (J^r ?*'*> 
that Makera shall pay Properties $10,0001>Y ci/<&X* A ' « - ^ — *"«-«. 
at the closing of such sale if, but only if, / - >i xf 
V
 % *the leasing of &- and all portions or trie / iter to Tenants tut 
\7\ purposes of occur zy by Tenants, K' 
whether incurred with or without suit or before or after 
judgment* including reasonable attorneys' fees) which may be 
incurred by or in connection with the enforcement or performance 
of any of the rights of Properties hereunder or under any 
agreement, instrument or document connected with or related to 
this Note. If principal or interest owing hereunder are not paid 
when due, interest shall thereafter accrue on the unpaid 
principal balance at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per 
annum, both before and after judgment. The entire balance of 
principal and interest owing hereunder shall mature and be 
payable in the event of sale or transfer by Makers of all or any 
portion of the Commonwealth Square Shopping Center located in J 
Sunset, Utah (,fthe Center"), provided, however, that (l)**l*e ^ V 
tgoasfeg ef leaceheld interests by Mahegs of all eg any perfcien 
of the Center, (2) the transfer of all or any portion of the 
Center to a corporation, partnership or other entity which is 
controlled by Makers or any one of them or a lineal descendant «*? 
ancestor of Makers or any one of them, •» (3) the transfer to a 
spouse^f lineal descendant eg ancestor of a Maker or to a trust 
naming a Maker or a spous%r,/ lineal descendant er aneestec of a 
Maker as a beneficiary**shall not be deemed to accelerate the 
maturity date for payment of principal and interest owing 
hereunder. The term "control" means ownership of more than fiffeyone* hund 
percent (5^)18r*the capital of a partnership or unincorporated 
entity or the ownership of more than/fifty percent (5-95J) of all 2rff-
classes of stock of a corporation, one hundred 100% j 
Presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest 
and of non-payment of this Note are hereby waived. 
In the event Properties determines that it will sell or 
discount this Note, and if Makers are not then in default 
hereunder, then Properties shall offer the right to Makers to 
purchase this Note on the same terms set forth in said offer. 
This Note is executed in connection with and pursuant 
to the terms of the letter agreement above-mentioned and certain 
other written agreements entered into between Makers, Properties 
and Stacey, and the terms thereof are hereby incorporated into 
and by reference made a part of this Note. 
VAL BAN CORP.
 f a California 
corporation j * . 
\_ **the sale or transfer by Makers of Unit 18 in the Center (provided, 
O ^ Y however, that Makers shall pav Properties $10,000.00 at the closing 
v H of such sale if, but only if>"the price for such Unit 18 equals or 
Bernie Goler T~~ 
Bonnie Goler 
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